1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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5	JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, :
6	Plaintiff, :CA No. 14-1966
7	v. :
8	BARACK OBAMA, et al,
9	Defendants. :
10	
11	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BERYL A. HOWELL
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14	Monday, December 22, 2014
15	APPEARANCES:
16	For the Plaintiff: FREEDOM WATCH
17	BY: LARRY KLAYMAN, ESQ. 2020 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
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19	For the Defendant: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
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21	wasningcon, b.c.
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23	Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript
24	produced by computer-aided transcription.
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PROCEEDINGS

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DEPUTY CLERK: Matter before the Court, Civil Action 14-1966, Joseph M. Arpaio v. Barack Obama, et al. Counsel please come forward and identify yourselves for the record.

MR. KLAYMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Larry Klayman, nice to see you.

THE COURT: Yes, nice to see you, Mr. Klayman. How are you?

MR. KLAYMAN: Good. I wanted to ask permission,
I have my paralegal and counsel sitting at the table with
me. Counsel is from Virginia. He's a Virginia lawyer.
His name is Jon Moseley.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Moseley.

MR. KLAYMAN: My paralegal's name is Dina James.

THE COURT: What's your paralegal's name?

MR. KLAYMAN: Dina James.

THE COURT: That's absolutely fine.

MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: And for the government.

MS. HARTNETT: Good morning, Your Honor.

Kathleen Hartnett from the Civil Division at the

Department of Justice for the defendants.

THE COURT: Yes, I saw your notice last night,

Ms. Hartnett.

1	MS. HARTNETT: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Am I pronouncing that correctly?
3	MS. HARTNETT: Yes, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Hartnett.
5	MS. HARTNETT: With me at counsel table is Adam
6	Kirschner from the Federal Programs Branch at the
7	Department of Justice.
8	THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Kirschner. All
9	right.
10	So this morning I have in front of me two
11	motions: the plaintiff's motion for preliminary
12	injunction and the government's motion for dismissal for
13	lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
14	Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). So why don't we start with you
15	Mr. Klayman.
16	MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Since yours was the first motion
18	filed.
19	MR. KLAYMAN: Does Your Honor have any timing
20	limitations?
21	THE COURT: None.
22	MR. KLAYMAN: None, okay. Thank you.
23	THE COURT: We can go on as long as I have
24	questions.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay.

1 THE COURT: Or you have things to say.

MR. KLAYMAN: I look forward to it, questions.

Your Honor, this is a case at the pinnacle of national importance. It's not really just a question about immigration enforcement. It's a question about our Constitution. It's a question about whether the president can override Congress, go around Congress. And that's why this is so important. It reminds me of another case that I had the privilege of arguing about a year ago before Judge Leon, which was involving the NSA where he granted a preliminary injunction, and that's what we're seeking here.

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, I did see reference in some parts of your brief to unlawful surveillance, warrantless unlawful surveillance and why it was in the public interest to grant the preliminary injunction.

MR. KLAYMAN: Perhaps it's on my mind. That was a brief that we filed, and then we filed a correction immediately after that. We were taking a little bit from a prior brief.

THE COURT: All right. So you filed a correction, I can see that. So you had success with one brief in front of another judge across the hall so you thought why not --

MR. KLAYMAN: Give it a try.

7?

THE COURT: Give it a try, got it. Does that explain why I've got two motions for preliminary injunctions from you?

MR. KLAYMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: One docketed at ECF 6 and one at ECF

MR. KLAYMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. I just wanted to make sure --

MR. KLAYMAN: The latter one is the one that governs. We picked that up a few minutes after it was filed.

THE COURT: I got it, okay, thank you.

MR. KLAYMAN: I appreciate you bringing that to the record's attention.

Your Honor, on March 28, 2011, President Obama stated to the American people, "America is a nation of laws, which means that I as president am obligated to enforce the law. I don't have a choice about that.

Congress passes a law. The Executive Branch's job is to enforce and implement these laws and then the judiciary to interpret the laws. There are enough laws on the books by Congress that are very clear in terms of how we have to enforce our immigration system."

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, I've heard that speech

and I've also seen it referenced in papers, so there's no need for you to be repeating things. I have read the papers quite thoroughly, and so let's hear from you about things that you want to supplement your papers with since, even though I've said there's no time limit, I also don't want to repeat everything that's in the papers.

MR. KLAYMAN: I understand that. I wanted to —
THE COURT: Let me just ask you because there
are a couple things that I wanted to be clear about in my
own mind. The plaintiff's supplemental declaration that
was filed on December 19th states in Paragraph 9 that he
seeks an injunction, and I quote, "on behalf of not just
myself and my office but all of the American people,"
which really addressed one of the questions I had in this
case about whether Joseph Arpaio was suing, you know, in
his personal capacity as a citizen of the United States or
only in his official capacity as sheriff of Maricopa
County or both.

MR. KLAYMAN: He's suing as both, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

MR. KLAYMAN: As we set forth in this affidavit, and I might add we're not seeking an injunction for all of the American people. It will have that impact, of course, in terms of precedent, but he's representing the people of Maricopa County.

THE COURT: Okay. So his entire affidavit is all about -- and the reason I was confused is because his affidavits that you filed on his behalf are all about the harms to his office. And so, you know, I was a little bit confused in terms of the framing of the caption of the complaint and some of his statements in the declaration, including the one I just read about whether he was also complaining in his personal capacity. If he is suing in his personal capacity, on what basis would he have standing?

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. I would look at Paragraph 40 of that affidavit, Your Honor. He's suing in part because --

THE COURT: You're talking about the supplemental affidavit?

MR. KLAYMAN: Supplemental affidavit. Because he himself has been threatened. He himself has been threatened by individuals on the basis of his stance on immigration.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that leads me to my next question. If he's suing because of -- you're talking, for example, about the notice that you filed just last night about the bomb threats, which was the press release from Maricopa County about bomb threats to the plaintiff in this case, that's the nature of the personal

injury to him?

nexus.

MR. KLAYMAN: In part, and there's another report which incorporates by reference into his affidavit which is attached as Exhibit 5 to that affidavit where an individual threatened him with death on the basis that his family was deported as a result of actions that were taken.

THE COURT: But if I read your notice last night, for example, it says specifically in the press release issued by the plaintiff and his office that the reason he received the death threats is because of his widely known stance regarding illegal immigration, and if that's the case, is there anything I could do here that would change the plaintiff's widely known stance on illegal immigration that would stop him from being threatened?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, there's a nexus here, and it doesn't have to be an absolute nexus. In terms of standing, I think you asked me the standing question -
THE COURT: Let's hear your explanation of that

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. The fact that he has himself filed this complaint which is seeking to enforce the immigration laws as they currently exist exacerbates a pre-existing condition where he's viewed as -- and he's

not because I know him quite well; he's a client as well as a friend. The image that's been created by some in the media, in particular, that he's anti-immigrant, he's not anti-immigrant, but he's been viewed as anti-illegal immigrant, people have threatened him repeatedly. There are protests going on as we speak in front of his sheriff's office in Phoenix today as a result of this complaint. And there is — and you'll probably see press reports about that — but there is a substantial likelihood that he will be threatened with severe bodily injury or death as a result of simply filing this case and trying to enforce the immigration laws.

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, I come back again to the evidence that you have submitted, you have submitted in this case with statements issued by the sheriff's office, and I'm reading page 2 of the document docketed at ECF 21-1, page 2, "All three aforementioned threats against Arpaio came as a result of the sheriff's widely known stance on illegal immigration," and I take it that there's nothing that I can say or do that is going to change his widely known stance on illegal immigration which he says was the cause of the threats. Am I correct on that?

MR. KLAYMAN: That's one cause of the threats.

And if you look at the actual attachments, Your Honor, the

exhibits, Exhibit 5 for instance, is that he was threatened with severe bodily injury or death by someone who as a result of his actions had his family deported from this country. What we are arguing in this case and the position that he's taken throughout is that we should enforce the immigration laws. He hands illegal aliens over to ICE --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. KLAYMAN: -- for deportation, yet they come back into his jail.

THE COURT: Okay. So I want to ask, just like I was a little puzzled by your papers about whether the plaintiff was suing in his personal or official capacity or both, I want to be clear about precisely what policies you're challenging here, Mr. Klayman. You have a broad phrase that you used, "the president's immigration policies." That just doesn't cut it for me when you're asking me to enjoin from the bench with the strike of my pen some national programs. I have to be absolutely clear what is it precisely you're asking me to challenge, you're asking me to enjoin and stop.

So let me be clear --

MR. KLAYMAN: Certainly.

THE COURT: -- and ask you to be clear about it.

So this is what I understand based on your

papers that you're challenging the policies that are announced in two memoranda: the memorandum from Janet Napolitano issued on June 15, 2012, entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, which I am going to refer to, as the parties do in their papers, as the DACA program, D-A-C-A.

You're also challenging the programs outlined in a memorandum from Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, dated November 20, 2014, titled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents. I'll call that program, as the parties do, the DAPA program, D-A-P-A. And the revisions to the DACA program, as the parties do in their papers.

So as I understand it, you're challenging the DACA program, the 2014 revisions to the DACA program and the DAPA program.

MR. KLAYMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Do I have that right?

MR. KLAYMAN: You do.

THE COURT: All right. So you are not challenging the policies that are announced, for example, because I take it that there were about ten memoranda that

were issued by Secretary Johnson on November. You're not challenging, for example, the memorandum from DHS

Secretary Jeh Johnson titled Expansion of the Provisional Waiver Program which allows, I guess, some eligible immigrants to travel overseas. You're not challenging that; is that correct?

MR. KLAYMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: And you're not challenging the memorandum on the same date, November 20, 2014, from the Secretary of DHS titled Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants, which as I've read it defines the priorities 1, 2 and 3 for the undocumented immigrants who are the priorities for federal enforcement authority. Am I correct on that?

MR. KLAYMAN: You're correct.

THE COURT: And you're also not challenging the memorandum of the same date, November 20, 2014, by the Secretary of Homeland Security entitled Policies
Supporting U.S. High-Skilled Business and Workers. Is that correct?

MR. KLAYMAN: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we're really down to these DACA program, DACA revisions program and the DAPA program. Is that right?

MR. KLAYMAN: That is right.

THE COURT: So with respect to the DACA program, which has been in effect since 2012, two years, how is it that you can show any kind of irreparable harm since it's taken you two years to challenge that program?

MR. KLAYMAN: What's set forth in the supplemental affidavit of Sheriff Arpaio is that since this new executive order has a memorandum, whatever you want to call it, it's kind of murky as to what the president did through DHS, but it is in effect an executive action in any event, and the president admits that.

THE COURT: What's murky about it?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, they call them memoranda rather than executive orders. Executive orders would ordinarily come out as an executive order. But we believe that for political purposes, because the president doesn't want to exceed the numbers of executive orders issued by other presidents, he's calling them memoranda right now and it's being implemented through the Department of Homeland Security.

THE COURT: Well, doesn't the president affect policy over the sprawling federal bureaucracy in a number of different ways? One way is executive orders; one way, signing statements. When they sign legislation into law, they have signing statements that tell agencies how the

president wants them interpreted. There are many different ways where presidents affect the execution of the laws.

MR. KLAYMAN: Absolutely.

I'm not sure I really understand essentially what difference that makes. I want to make sure I'm not missing your point, Mr. Klayman. So what difference does it make?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, the primary point is that what the president has done through these memoranda, which are executive actions, is not policy. He's enacting law. He's creating law. And he cannot override Congress in doing that under Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution; all legislative powers —

THE COURT: Why is it that you say it's not a policy? I mean, you know, I have information that's been submitted in the -- by you, actually, as part of the Department of Justice's OOC memorandum that the government's brief was talked about; that the resources in DHS to handle undocumented immigrants in this country, you know, only allows deportation of 400,000 out of the 11-point some, 11-plus million such immigrants. So they have to figure out their enforcement priorities.

So why -- do you dispute those numbers, first of

all; and second of all, why isn't that an appropriate focus of administrative, administration policy of how they are going to take limited resources and target it even if you disagree with their targets, but why isn't that an appropriate function, first of all, of the president to give that kind of guidance through his cabinet secretaries and why isn't that appropriate?

MR. KLAYMAN: First of all, I might say, Your Honor, that this is not in any way an attack on this particular president. Presidents in the past have violated executive orders and courts have overturned them. This president, in fact, just about a year ago had one overturned with regard to the National Labor Relations Board where he did an interim appointment. It's not unusual for courts to overturn executive actions.

Presidents do try to extend their powers as much as they can, and that's the reason why we have the courts and that's the reason why I'm proud to be in front of you, because you are the protector of the American people.

But let me get to the point. I don't dispute the numbers. But this president in particular has not been shy about asking for money for appropriations. We're now at a budget deficit of \$18 trillion. It's increased several trillion since he's been president. No request was ever made to Congress to increase the appropriation so

that border security could be enhanced and so people could be deported who are here illegally.

What's happened here — and I don't mean any disrespect to the president — is that he's trying to force the hand of the next Congress is that by putting in effect the law in effect — in fact, he's made reference to that, some of the quotes I was going to read you, he's daring them to do what he wants and to enact. He said several times, 22 times in the past, that he's not an emperor. That he does not have the power to legislate as a president.

And that's the bottom line here. He did not ask for the money, but all of a sudden after the fact he and his colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security decide, well, we don't have the money so we have to leave all these people here. Here is an irony too --

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, let me just say that, you know, I'm well aware of my power to undo executive actions of agencies. And I do exercise that power humbly when necessary. And I fully appreciate that you're inviting me in this case to protect Congress's prerogative to act in the immigration arena. But I have some pause, given the power of Congress to control purse, the purse strings, to tell the president exactly how Congress feels about whether the president's interpretation of the

immigration laws and enforcement priorities for the immigration laws are ones that Congress accepts or does not.

When it comes to deferred removal programs, the government's brief has outlined -- you know, the deferred removal programs have been longstanding in this country dating back to the 1970s. It was very interesting for me to read that and that Congress has, in fact, sanctioned the use of deferred removal programs in -- with reference to them embodied in the law.

So deferred removal programs per se are the kinds of enforcement prioritization that the executive branch has exercised over a number of administrations, over a number of years, at least 30, that Congress has sanctioned; and if Congress doesn't like it, doesn't Congress have the power to step in and address whatever misprioritization it thinks is going on here without the Court accepting your invitation and reaching out to intervene in this Legislative-Executive Branch squabble?

MR. KLAYMAN: You asked a really good question that has a number of different responses to it. First of all, we're talking here about, first talked about appropriation. We cited a Supreme Court case called Chadha where President Nixon decided he wasn't going to spend money that Congress had appropriated. Supreme Court

said, No, you can't make that decision. You can't override Congress; the money has been appropriated. This money has been appropriated maybe ipso, after the fact the president said it's not enough, but it's been appropriated for enforcement for deportation.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. KLAYMAN: He's shutting -- he's shutting down the potential of deportation.

I really -- I looked at Chadha, I appreciate how you're using Chadha in this case, but I really fail to see how Chadha is applicable here where Chadha was a blatant, you know, response by the president to the Congress, You've given me money and told me how you want me to spend it.

I'm just not going to spend it the way you want. That is an appropriate role for the Court to step in and say No, no, no, you can't -- you are not the emperor, you have to follow the directions.

This program is a deferred removal program, you know, as I said, longstanding practice for prioritization of resources that have been provided by Congress. I just don't see how *Chadha* is at all applicable here.

MR. KLAYMAN: Chadha is applicable on two different grounds. One, with regard to purse strings or something for the Congress to decide, and Congress has

appropriated this money for use in large part in deportation proceedings against illegal aliens. Secondly --

THE COURT: I do think Chadha would be applicable if Congress passed a law saying to the president, You may not expend any funds for the DACA program, the revised, you know, DACA program, the revised DACA program or the DAPA program. Then if the president proceeded, I think then you might have a Chadha issue. But that's not what happened.

MR. KLAYMAN: Let me tell you respectfully, Your Honor, why you have it, Your Honor, just teeing the question up. That's why I started with that aspect of your question is because the money is being used not for purposes which it was appropriated, which was immigration enforcement of the current law, but if you look at these memoranda, they are deferring benefits which go part far beyond the current law.

and immunity from prosecution authority. It's their employment authorization cards for the right to work, regardless of whether you're legal or illegal; the opportunity to use the law to get a work authorization card to get a state driver's license. From that you can get the right to vote — not the right to vote but you can

present it and no questions are asked and sign up on the register to vote. Plus there are background checks here for nearly 5 million illegal immigrants. This costs money.

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, really this is not a case about purported voter fraud. Is that what you're saying one of the harms is, voter fraud?

MR. KLAYMAN: It can be one of the harms. It's not something we put into the affidavit, but it can be.

What I'm saying to Your Honor is is that the monies are being used for purposes that were not appropriated by

Congress to use the monies for, and I just listed various aspects of that, including background checks for potentially 5 million illegal aliens. There has never been — and this is the third part in answer to your question — there's never been any deferred action here on this grand scale. 5 million people, nearly half of the illegal immigrant population. It's never been done to that extent.

I'm not condoning what President Bush did
earlier for 1.2. But he didn't have all these different
aspects to it when money was being spent for purposes that
Congress had not authorized it for. And that's a
important aspect here. This is a very expensive --

THE COURT: Are you saying, Mr. Klayman, that

the old, the longstanding prior deferred removal programs implemented from the '70s up to today did not carry with them a work permit certificate? Is that -- is that the factual matter of what you're saying, that this deferred removal program differs because it has a work certificate authorization?

MR. KLAYMAN: Some of them -- I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you. Some of them did not, yes.

THE COURT: But some of them did.

MR. KLAYMAN: I'm not sure. I'm trying to be -I haven't studied the prior ones, okay.

In any event, what we said in our brief was it doesn't matter what other presidents did. We're challenging this now. And I can tell you if you know my reputation -- I think you do -- I gave President George W. Bush a pretty hard time. I just don't bring cases with regard to Democrat [sic] presidents. I sued them over warrantless wiretaps. The Cheney Energy Task Force. I'm thought of as a Libertarian conservative. My supporters weren't that kind to me over doing that.

I'm doing this on the basis of principle, and so is Sheriff Arpaio. It doesn't matter what Bush did in the past or Clinton or anybody else, this is not right and it's not legal.

And there are many aspects that go beyond the

work permits. They are dealing with background checks for nearly 5 million illegal aliens; and one of the problems here — and we can to this later if you want, is that it's a blanket, in effect, amnesty to these people, because —

THE COURT: So can we go back to my original question?

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Which is, I'm not sure I really fully understand your answer. Putting aside the revisions to the DACA program and the DAPA program, which are fairly of recent vintage, how can you establish irreparable harm from a program that you're only suing on two years after it came into effect, the DACA program?

MR. KLAYMAN: Number one, as set forth in the affidavit, since this has gone into effect on November 20, 2014 --

THE COURT: Oh, you're back to the bomb threats.

MR. KLAYMAN: No, not the bomb threats. What happens here is that illegal aliens who are turned over by the sheriff's office -- and this is primarily a case about his office. I just mentioned one aspect, personal aspect of it, but that's a very small part of this case. It's about the function of his office, which strains his resources and takes away law enforcement priorities to do things which unfortunately are not productive because of

the executive action of this president is that he turns over after sentences are fulfilled in his jail --

THE COURT: I do understand --

MR. KLAYMAN: -- and then they come back.

THE COURT: Part of your argument is that these three programs, DACA, revised DACA and the DAPA program are going to be a magnet for other immigrants to come illegally into the country. And that because of that magnet it's going to burden the resources of the plaintiff's sheriff's office. Do I have that right?

MR. KLAYMAN: No, that's just one part. That's a small part. That's what the government would like you to believe, okay. We're taught in law school, always shape the argument in the most favorable light. That argument is extremely disingenuous.

THE COURT: Well, that's why you're here, Mr. Klayman.

MR. KLAYMAN: Right.

THE COURT: So that you can respond. You asked for oral argument, so here you are.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. And I used to be a Justice Department lawyer too, so I know how we're taught, keep it simple. KISS over at the department. They want to keep it simple, it's not that simple. The reality is -- and this is where most of the harm comes in and it's set forth

in the supplemental affidavit in particular -- is that illegal immigrants who are serving time for crimes, when those sentence are concluded, are turned over to ICE, to DHS, the immigration authorities. Because the deportation laws were not being enforced or for that matter any other immigration law that's related thereto, these criminals wind up back in the jail, they wind up getting rearrested and that costs -- we detailed over \$9 million of greater costs, which included part of this period.

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, this is the fallacy, the logical fallacy that I perceive in that argument:

Those are harms that the plaintiff is claiming even before the DACA program or the revised DACA program have gone into effect. So how can these programs that you're seeking to stop have any causative effect or redressability possibility for those particular harms that you have laid out in the plaintiff's original affidavit and the supplemental affidavit? And redressability and causation? Prerequisites for standing here.

MR. KLAYMAN: Let me turn your attention first to Paragraph 38 of the supplemental affidavit. Based on the average length of stay, I estimate that Maricopa County incurred an additional expense of \$9,293,619.96 from February 1, 2014, through December 17, 2014. That's over a month — that's about a month since this was

implemented. So there is an overlap. They are continuing to get these illegal immigrants who have been released come back into the jails, which are incurring expense. So yes, it does fall within the time period after this presidential memorandum was implemented on November 20. So that's in the record, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But it hasn't been implemented yet.

It's been announced, but I think it has a 180-day lag

period even before, you know, applications for eligibility

determinations are made. Am I right on that date?

MR. KLAYMAN: Your Honor, having relied upon the argument in the Justice Department's brief, which was frankly misleading, notice that they didn't submit one affidavit. They did not go under oath on anything. They didn't want to put their money where their mouth is.

There is nothing in that record which contravents our affidavit. They just threw in a bunch of documents. Why didn't they go under oath and swear what was going on, because what we know —

THE COURT: But Mr. Klayman, let's not -- let's not play to the gallery here. We all understand as lawyers, that it is your burden, not the government's to establish standing. It's your burden to introduce the affidavits --

MR. KLAYMAN: And we have.

THE COURT: -- to establish your standing. The government doesn't have that burden.

MR. KLAYMAN: It's a very low threshold at this point. Let me tell you why on standing. But let me back up on this. I just read to you one paragraph, more than one paragraph in the supplemental affidavit which deals with what's happening and how it's increasing costs to Maricopa County since these memoranda opinion were issued. In addition, we have set forth —

THE COURT: Because of the magnet effect?

MR. KLAYMAN: I'm not talking about magnet.

Yes, there is a magnet, that's another aspect, but it's because illegal immigrants that have been arrested for crimes, for state crimes — we don't enforce the federal immigration law, the United States has already, the U.S. Supreme Court said no, that's a federal province. I was actually part of that case as an amicus, because people who have been arrested, illegal immigrants for state crimes, once they serve their sentence are let out and turned over to ICE. They then are not in any way deported or having any action taken against them. They are let out into the Maricopa County community; they commit other crimes and they wind up back in the jail at a rate of 36 percent approximately.

THE COURT: And for --

MR. KLAYMAN: This has happened since the memorandum has come out.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, these are people who have committed, as you said, by your definition a state crime, been arrested for a state crime; whatever happens to them in the state criminal justice system happens and then they are turned over to ICE for processing. And what you're saying is that instead of -- ICE instead of deporting them releases them. Do I have that right?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, they are not ordered to release them. If it's not a major crime, they are ordered to release them under this deferred action program. They are back out into the public domain, they are being rearrested for committing other crimes and they wind up back in the jail. These people are repeat offenders.

THE COURT: Your complaint is because one of the eligibility requirements for the DAPA program is that the particular undocumented immigrant does not fall within one of the categories of enforcement that's set out in the memorandum on enforcing, you know, that sets out the priorities 1, 2 and 3 for enforcement. Is that right?

MR. KLAYMAN: It could be a case, but it's also the case that this administration just simply is not even enforcing that aspect of things. Because what they're doing is they are just letting people out who have

committed crimes rather than -- if you commit a crime, you generally get deported, no matter what that crime may be, notwithstanding this criteria.

THE COURT: Well, as I've read the plaintiff's affidavit, he has a complaint that undocumented immigrants that are picked up by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department, processes them and then they are turned over to ICE are being released. And that is the complaint that I take it predates the DACA program, the revised DACA program and the DAPA program; right?

MR. KLAYMAN: It's been a running complaint, but what happened here, Your Honor, is an exacerbation. I'm going to get to standing cases in a second. This is an exacerbation of the current situation, because it's not just that some of them, 36 percent, are coming back; but now under this program, this executive action, they are all going to be out there unless they commit some heinous crime. They are all going to be out in the community, vandalizing, assaulting, whatever the case may be. They are out there and they are coming back to the jails. And that increases the costs, and we documented from that time period I just read to you, increased it over \$9 million. And that goes into the period after the president's executive action took effect.

Now, we also gave you the other day a case by

Judge Schwab in the Western --

THE COURT: Well, you keep saying "in effect," but what you mean is after the president's policies were announced, they are not in effect. And they are not even accepting applications, I think, until 180 days after the November 20 announcement; right?

MR. KLAYMAN: They are in effect -- you have 180 days to apply, okay.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. They are in effect right now. You can apply right now.

In addition, as is in the record, the Department of Homeland Security is hiring thousands of other employees to process. Now, granted these applications — and here is another irony. They put in effect a fee of \$465 to apply. How many illegal immigrants are going to come to the surface here and show their face when they have to ante up \$465? Most of them in all likelihood want to remain illegal rather than having to pay it. The president's policies, and I'll get to that later —

THE COURT: Let me just say, it was curious to me to read in your briefs your expressions of concern over undocumented immigrants paying \$465 to make their application for their eligibility review for the revised DACA program and the DAPA program and your concern that

they may not get a refund of their money. I take it you're not here on behalf of the undocumented immigrants who may be eligible for these programs.

MR. KLAYMAN: I'm not here on behalf of them,
Your Honor; but as an aside, if you know anything about
me, I'm not anti-immigration. In 1996 I did a
presidential debate at the National Press Club that was
trying to say that immigration is good for this country.
I'm not anti. And that's the problem, people tar you with
that, they think you're conservative, you're
anti-immigrant, you're a homophobe and everything else.
I'm not.

And the reality is that we are a system of laws and not men, as our second president, John Adams said. And those laws need to be respected. The precedent here is terrible. It's trashing our Constitution. It's more important than the immigration issue even. And that's what's at issue, and that's why the president 22 times said I can't do this, I'm not an emperor, why are you pressing on me? When it's politically convenient, then he does it. Other presidents have done the same thing, but that doesn't make it right and that's not precedent.

What's precedent is the Constitution, that's what counts.

Now; let me get into the standing issues. Judge Helen Segal Huvelle, one of your colleagues, in a case,

Honeywell Intern, Inc. v. EPA, found that chemical manufacturers had standing because the challenged regulation could lead customers to seek out manufacturers' competitors in the future. She didn't require an absolute direct nexus for standing.

In fact, and this is ironic, the case involving SB 1070 -- and we also cited this case -- a Supreme Court case where the case was the U.S. Government and I was, I participated as an intervenor in that case, I represented the -- it tells you where I come from -- the Arizona Latino Republicans, Latinos, who were supporting that law, legal immigration. And in that case the Supreme Court did not throw the case out on standing, nor did the lower courts, but the administration was challenging whether these stop-and-ask situations by the police where they would stop someone on probable cause and ask for their immigration papers to see whether they were here legally. The administration was challenging that, and yet that law had not gone into effect yet. And standing was found by the lower courts and upheld by the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Klayman, you have put your finger on one of the critical issues for standing in this case, which is how much is the plaintiff's alleged injury, in fact, which has to be concrete and particularized for him to have standing in this case dependent on the actions

of multiple third parties in the form of undocumented immigrants. And when I look at, with all due respect, my colleague's opinions on this issue but, in fact, look at what binds me, which is the D.C. Circuit opinions, in cases such as Crete Carrier Corp. from 2004, the National Wrestling Coaches Association from also 2004, where the D.C. Circuit has made clear that when the injury, in fact, depends on what the conduct is of third parties, you've got a big standing problem. So how do you address those cases?

MR. KLAYMAN: These are not third parties here we're talking about. The president and his administration, the Department of Homeland Security is not third parties. This is a direct hit.

THE COURT: Well, the injury that the plaintiff is alleging here is because the -- as a result of the policies, third parties, undocumented immigrants are going to react in a particular way. One, they are going to use those policies as a magnet to come to the United States, increasing undocumented illegal immigration to the country; and two, that certain parts of those, that population are going to commit crimes.

MR. KLAYMAN: No --

THE COURT: That attacks the sheriff's resources.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. There you have it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So it's those third parties -MR. KLAYMAN: Yes, it's a direct impact on the
sheriff's office. This sheriff stands in no different
position than the 24 states that brought an action in
Texas.

THE COURT: That case was not in front of me, and I don't think that that Court has yet opined on the --

MR. KLAYMAN: No, you're right, but there's a Court in the Western District of Pennsylvania that has opined and has found the president's actions unconstitutional, Western District of Pennsylvania, Judge Schwab.

THE COURT: Let's talk about that case. I found it a little bit --

MR. KLAYMAN: And he didn't opine. That's a ruling.

THE COURT: Some commentators have called that case complex. I just find it a puzzle. As I understand the context of that case, there was a defendant in front of the judge awaiting sentencing for illegal reentry, and the judge, as he was required to do, evaluated the sentencing factor, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6), which calls upon sentencing courts to impose a sentence that avoids

unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants convicted of the same crime. And in the context of considering that factor, sentencing factor, unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants convicted of the same crime, reached out and decided that he had to decide the constitutionality of the DACA program in order to ascertain whether the time-served sentence called for in that case under the federal sentencing guidelines was, would result in an unwarranted sentencing disparity.

And then the Court -- the aspect of the case that puzzles me, among others, is that the Court concluded that this defendant wasn't eligible for the DAPA program and therefore was not similarly situated to defendants who might be eligible but then proceeded to evaluate the constitutionality of the program.

So it wasn't even having found that the defendant wasn't eligible for the DAPA program, that defendant was no longer -- was not similarly situated defendants who might be. I actually find it a real puzzle how he was able to then reach out and evaluate the constitutionality of this program, which didn't apply to the defendant in front of him.

MR. KLAYMAN: I didn't read it that way. Here is the way I read it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KLAYMAN: I read it that the defendant who was trying to change his plea, he was going to plea, was pleading to a crime where he could be deported under that provision. And the defendant was claiming, in effect the defense, that under this new DACA program, DAPA program, I should remain here, I don't want to be deported.

THE COURT: No, no, no. The defendant wasn't claiming that. In fact, the defendant didn't even raise this issue. The defendant was going to be sentenced to time served and didn't raise the issue at all. The Court sua sponte raised the issue, which is fine. Courts have a statutory obligation to consider that factor and look at the consideration for that factor. But I don't think the defendant even contended in the case, based on my reading of the opinion, that he was even eligible for the DAPA program.

MR. KLAYMAN: That's what I glean from it or whether it was expressed or whether it was implied, the defendant didn't want to be deported from the United States. So the judge reached that issue and he said, No, you're still subject to deportation because this was unconstitutional, you're not going to be able to have this umbrella.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say that case is

from another circuit. It's a District Court opinion, and because of the puzzling nature of how the judge reached the decision on the constitutionality, I really don't find it at all persuasive either. So let's, we can move on from the Pennsylvania District Court opinion.

MR. KLAYMAN: No, that's fine, but I was citing that, that there was a federal judge who found this unconstitutional. We got there from Texas as to whether Texas had anything to do with here.

THE COURT: Well, you raised it, Mr. Klayman. I just wanted to share with you my views so you wouldn't waste any more time.

MR. KLAYMAN: I understand. There are myriad of other cases that we cited in our briefs on standing. And one of them is International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 761 F.2d 802, that is the D.C. Circuit in 1985, standing is found despite lack of details regarding specific future jobs. It was jobs impact into the future, not present. And standing can result — we've ask for declaratory judgment here too, Your Honor, which is when harm is imminent. It doesn't actually have to occur right now, but it has to be imminent. So we have a declaratory judgment provision, too, as one of our counts.

THE COURT: With respect to your imminent harm, I did want to hear, Mr. Klayman, your response to the

government's argument that these, the deferred removal program because of its special targeting of priority enforcement, you know, immigrants, illegal immigrants, will actually help local law enforcement. So how do you respond to that argument?

MR. KLAYMAN: I don't think that's a sensical argument. It's not rationally based. It doesn't help local law enforcement to let people out on the streets who have committed crimes and are winding up back in the jail. It puts a strain on resources.

In the courtroom today is my brother. He's a policeman in Philadelphia. I wish he could come up here and testify. He knows all about that, criminals back on the streets in Philadelphia or anywhere else. And that's what's happening in Maricopa County. Maricopa County is the largest sheriff's office, at least in terms of land mass, in this country. It puts a great strain on the resources to have these people out there and not subject to deportation.

And that's the essence of our argument no matter how the government wants to couch it. You can't put lipstick on a pig. This is not a case about primarily drawing people to this country. This is a case about the burden on resources of this sheriff's office. It's already stretched incredibly thin, and that's what it's

about.

I know known Sheriff Arpaio for a long time. I never heard one negative biased remark against Latinos or I wouldn't represent him if he did. And SB 1070, I came in there and I told the Supreme Court, I said if Latinos' rights are violated in terms of stop and questioning and searched, Freedom Watch, my group, will be the first group that came to their defense. I lived in Miami for a long time. I represented the Cuban-American community, a lot of other communities. This is not about Latinos. This is about our laws and enforcing our laws.

THE COURT: I think I understand your arguments, Mr. Klayman. But if you have anything further, you can save it for your reply.

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, I did have a little -- I want to talk about the APA for a little, if I may.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KLAYMAN: National Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 643 F.3d 311 D.C. Circuit July 1, 2011, recent case. Wherein, you know, this is dealing with environmental protection, also questions of causation, because these questions are brought and standing is found with regard to APA edicts, some by executive order or memoranda which are to take effect in the future. Here is what's going to happen if

this goes into effect.

And standing has been found and preliminary injunctions have been granted. So there are a number of cases, Your Honor, and I know from the other case that we had that you're a very scholarly person and that you'll read those and have an open mind on this because this is not in any way geared against the Latino community or any other community. It's called protecting our Constitution.

With regard to the APA, there's a requirement when you have these kinds of substantive rights that are being doled out by presidential action or by an agency, an agency like the DHS whose memorandum that I enumerated before, there is a duty to have at least rule-making, notice and comment. And that's under Section 702 through 706, notice and comment. And under 7062, 5 U.S.C. 7062, the Court must hold unlawful and set aside any agency which is "arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; B, contrary to constitutional right" — constitutional right is what is at issue here in part — "power, privilege or immunity; or C, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or short of statutory authority."

THE COURT: I know, Mr. Klayman, that under the APA should you prevail on your standing and the government's substantial challenge to standing here and

therefore this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, but let's say you prevail on that, as I appreciate that you said that one of the key major questions here is whether the programs that are challenged are a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and, you know, I appreciate that you call them phony and disingenuous or the description of them is a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion, you call that phony and disingenuous because the guidelines used a standardized approach and I was a little bit curious about that because it sort of seems like the Executive Branch is therefore sort of between a rock and a hard place.

If they have fairly clear guidelines for their enforcement priorities in the immigration arena, it's too standardized and, you know, you call it phony and disingenuous. But if they don't have very clear guidance somewhat, their priorities would be, they would certainly be subject to a challenge for being arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable under the APA. So where are you drawing that line --

MR. KLAYMAN: That's a good question.

THE COURT: -- with regard to what the APA program is in your view with these policies?

MR. KLAYMAN: First of all, why it is phony and disingenuous, no disrespect, I could have used stronger

language.

THE COURT: You could have used stronger language than phony and disingenuous? Those words sort of hopped off the brief to my eyes, fairly, you know, noteworthy.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: In terms of your views.

MR. KLAYMAN: I could have used Woody Allen's expression, a sham was a sham was a sham. The reality here is that because the breadth is so broad and because it's clear to have prosecutorial -- prosecutorial discretion --

THE COURT: When you say "breadth," you mean the numbers?

MR. KLAYMAN: The numbers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KLAYMAN: And there are no criteria to really determine, except a few criteria — and I'll get into that — what is at issue. So broad that an immigration enforcement person cannot possibly process the applications of 5 million illegal immigrants, and the law is clear, and even the Justice Department admitted in its earlier memorandum when the president said I can't be an emperor, is that you have to do it on a case-by-case basis.

So are we going to process 5 million illegal immigrants on a case-by-case basis? That's irrational. You talk about trying to save funds, and that's why it's phony and disingenuous. Just to process 5 million potential illegal immigrants for -- and using prosecutorial discretion is going to bust our budget to the point where we won't be able to do anything else at INS or anywhere else. You can't process that. And it requires a background check for either of them.

THE COURT: Why do you think it can't be processed? In the DACA program the government presented statistics that -- and you also challenged the DACA program -- that it resulted in a denial of 36,860 applications as of December 5, 2014. So those are tens of thousands of denials that were done on a case-by-case basis.

MR. KLAYMAN: Out of 766,000 illegals. That's a very low percentage.

THE COURT: But it's not 100 percent. It's not a hundred percent that we're just rubber stamping.

MR. KLAYMAN: No, we never said 100 percent,

Your Honor, but most of these people are getting through
the system. They are not being processed. That's why
this is irrational is that you can't. There's no rational
basis for us to process 5 million people doing background

checks with personnel. That's why there's an immediate impact. That's why they are hiring more people right now. The people they are hiring isn't even enough. This is all a manipulation to have the president step in to try to force the hand of Congress to meet his political promises that he made years ago. And right now the president — and I don't mean this in a political sense, but he appears not to even care about his own party anymore. He's doing what he wants to do.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Klayman. I think -- MR. KLAYMAN: Can I say one last thing?

THE COURT: One last thing.

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes, one last thing and that is that Your Honor's duty, in all due respect, and I know you take it seriously, is to enforce the law. And with regard to the rule-making in these presidential memorandum, and there's a couple of examples there, one is dealing with changing --

THE COURT: How about presidential memoranda, let's be clear. They are DHS --

MR. KLAYMAN: The president signs off of them, but they do come out of DHS. Even in those memoranda we cited in our brief where DHS and the president are admitting they have to do rule-making such as changing visa requirements based on employment. They in effect

have shot themselves in the foot with that admission in terms of the APA, because at a minimum they should have done rule-making here. Thirty days notice and comment, the American people have a right to comment on this, and what we're asking is not a lot. We're just saying, Your Honor, enjoin this and allow for rule-making, let them, let them publish a rule as they should do under the APA. Because we meet the requirements here for a rule. And courts have done that before. I realize this is a real big --

THE COURT: Mr. Klayman, you surprise me with your last comment. Because I had read your complaint as asking me to enjoin these programs as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers and not just to stop them for a rule-making, notice of comment rule-making to take place. Am I wrong on that?

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. And as I just read to you under 706, arbitrary and capricious and abuse of discretion are otherwise not in accordance with law. This is arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion.

THE COURT: Right. I'm just reading Count I of your complaint.

MR. KLAYMAN: And are contrary to constitutional rights.

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Klayman, I'm reading

Count I of your complaint that says that it violates the Constitution and Paragraph 52 is ultravirus and you want a declaratory judgment to that effect to stop it in its tracks.

MR. KLAYMAN: Right. And the second count talks about violation of rule-making requirements.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAYMAN: Third cause of action, violation of existing regulatory authority and we cite the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702 through 5 U.S.C. 706. This is not rocket science when it comes to the APA. When I was a Justice lawyer I represented the FDA, Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. I had to defend regulations that were promulgated, some without notice and comment. And when the agency messed up, they had to go back and redo it or the Courts enjoined it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Klayman.

MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you. I appreciate your questions and time.

THE COURT: And Ms. Hartnett.

MS. HARTNETT: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd be happy to address any specific questions that the Court has.

THE COURT: Yes. I mean, Mr. Klayman has raised this issue about, you know, undocumented immigrants

eligible for those programs who are accepted into the, I guess, both the DACA program and the revised DACA program and the DAPA program as receiving a certificate. Could you explain, what is this certificate?

MS. HARTNETT: I think that's a reference to an employment identification card, so when the person applies for either the DACA program or DAPA program, they both make an application for deferred action which is reviewed on a case-by-case basis and they also make an employment authorization card. And I believe that card, if it were to be issued, would be a piece of documentation that would identify the person as having received deferred action.

THE COURT: And does that -- and so the undocumented immigrant who receives this certificate, does the person get a Social Security number so if they do, if the person does get employment the person can pay taxes and enter the Social Security program? Is that also part of it?

MS. HARTNETT: Your Honor, I want to make sure I don't go beyond what we put before the Court in the brief, but I believe they do receive an identifying number which will allow them to have taxes taken from their wages going forward. This is part of, again, not the DACA and DAPA program itself but part of a pre-existing regulatory scheme that's been in place since 1981 which includes

people receiving deferred action among many other groups of people under the immigration laws as eligible for employment authorization while they are in that status which, again, is a temporary status that could be revoked at any time but allows them employment during that time period.

THE COURT: And one of the things that I talked to Mr. Klayman about is whether any of the other fairly long-standing deferred removal programs that have been implemented over the past 20, 30 years, did those also have this work certificate accompanying the grant of the deferred removal, you know, status?

MS. HARTNETT: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, among, one of the most significant examples would be the 1990 Family Fairness Program, which you'll see an opinion in our brief that applied to 1.5 million people and also included ability to apply for employment authorization.

And, again, that would be something that would be standard regardless; if someone is in the deferred action category and has received deferred action according to preexisting regulation, they would be able to apply for employment authorization.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, one thing that I also wanted clarification on is in footnote 23 of your brief you cite statistics regarding the applicants under the

DAPA program, and you state that 42,632 applications have been rejected and 36,860 applications were denied. What's the difference between a rejection and a denial?

MS. HARTNETT: Thank you for asking and sorry we didn't provide that information in our brief. The rejection is something that — and we can provide additional information to the Court if necessary. But a rejection would be something that would be facially not complying with the requirements, for example, maybe lacking a signature. I believe it was only one of the substantive requirements of the DACA program that would be kind of a facial basis for just rejecting the application and sending it back, and I think that was if the person was above the age of 30. I can confirm that.

But I think the most relevant statistic — that is a relevant statistic because it shows some initial vetting going on and then the 36,000 number would be people whose application was actually processed and considered but rejected, and that could be for not meeting the other criteria or, as the DACA program sets forth, because discretion was determined to be inappropriate under a case—by—case basis.

THE COURT: Because Mr. Klayman, you know, did suggest that the 36,860 number of denied DACA applications was, you know, fairly low as a percentage of the total

numbers deemed eligible and granted. But, you know, I do think it's important to point out that there was this other 42,000, right.

MS. HARTNETT: That's correct.

THE COURT: That were rejected.

MS. HARTNETT: And also if I can add that it makes sense, the lower rate there is a significant rate, if not an extremely high rate. It does take some, for a person to come forward and identify themselves, one would imagine they want to met the criteria in light of what that meant to actually identify yourselves to the authorities. So at some level it seems reasonable that there be a relatively high rate of people to be accepted because one would have to be careful to make sure they met the criteria before they identified themselves.

THE COURT: The plaintiff has raised this in support of his irreparable harm requirement for preliminary injunctive relief as well as in support of his showing of an injury in fact to establish the necessary standing in the case that there are undocumented immigrants who commit crimes or picked up by the sheriff's office and then released to ICE and released into the community again and commit other crimes. And as I understand Mr. Klayman's argument — and I'm sure he'll have an opportunity to apply and correct me if I'm

wrong -- but as I understand Mr. Klayman's argument, when the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office now takes these undocumented immigrants, turns -- who are committing state crimes, processed through the state system, turns them over to ICE, if they are eligible for this program they are just going to be released into the community again. So what happens to individuals in terms of their eligibility for either the DACA or the DAPA program if they've committed a crime on their deferred removal status?

MS. HARTNETT: Your Honor, so in the first place the person would likely, you know, not be eligible for DACA or DAPA if they had a significant criminal offense, and both of those programs incorporate into them a requirement that the person not be convicted of a significant crime and not be a national security or public safety threat.

So that's an initial response as to why -there's several reasons why there's no nexus between these
programs and the harms that are being alleged here, but
that would be one of them.

But even assuming that the person had at some point committed a crime again, no basis in the record for concluding that, the status is revocable at any time.

When I say "status," I mean the deferred action category.

When someone receives deferred action, it may be revoked at any time. They could be deported at any time. That could be another potential option for someone, if there were a hypothetical person who received DACA and DAPA and nonetheless committed a crime after that.

Again, there's no record evidence at all that any of the people about whom he's complaining were people that had received DACA or DAPA and then went on to commit a crime in the community. He seems to be, as the Court was indicating, challenging some other aspect of immigration enforcement at the federal issue that's not really at issue in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Could you clarify for me, because maybe it's just confused in my head, the effective date of the DAPA program and the revised DACA program, because I thought the revised DACA program had a 90-day date before it became effective and the DAPA program had 180-day date to be effective.

So could you just explain how those two dates operated. Are they effective now, as Mr. Klayman says, and the government's just receiving applications for a 90-day period and a 180-day period? Could you just explain whether I'm confused on the effective date.

MS. HARTNETT: No, you're not confused, and the programs are pursuant to memoranda. The terms of the

memoranda are not yet in effect. The revised DACA program applications should be, begin to be received starting on February 18 of 2015, approximately, but that would be the date, the 90-day date from the date of announcement. And for the DAPA program, that would take you to May 19, 2015, to even be able to submit an application. Because at that point there would still have to be a period of time for the consideration of the application, so even those dates would not be dates of necessarily beginning to grant requests under those applications.

Now, there is the ongoing DACA process from 2012, and that continues. But these, the revisions to the process will take effect pursuant to the memoranda.

THE COURT: So just so we're absolutely clear, the earliest date that anybody could be granted a DAPA deferred removal status is 180 days after November 20; is that right?

MS. HARTNETT: Correct, for DAPA, yes.

THE COURT: All right. Okay, good. I wanted to clarify that myself.

All right. Is there anything else you want to add to your papers?

MS. HARTNETT: If I could just make a couple of quick points. I wanted to react to one, there was some dispute here about what exactly was being complained of,

and I would direct the Court's attention to, among other things, Paragraph 16 of the supplemental declaration where the declarant does make the point that he seems to be attacking President Obama's six years of promising what is in effect amnesty, so I think again kind of to the point of another indicia here that we have a generalized grievance or a political dispute as opposed to an actual concrete dispute.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, Mr. Klayman's papers do refer to these programs, the challenged programs, DACA, revised DACA and DAPA as an amnesty. Does the government view them as an amnesty in any way, and why not?

MS. HARTNETT: No, Your Honor, we don't, and I think the repeated use of that term kind of obscures the actual nature of the program, which is the temporary deferral of deportation to allow the government to focus on its most critical pressing threats which include border security threats and national security and public safety threats and serious criminals. So this does not provide a legal status or a pathway to citizenship but is in essence a way to put a group of cases to the side after individualized consideration to really allow the enforcement authorities to really focus on the most critical priorities in light of limited resources.

THE COURT: But it is an amnesty to the extent

that if somebody who has been granted this deferred removal status is picked up by immigration authorities, they do get an amnesty from being deported; is that right?

MS. HARTNETT: They have their card that will provide the identification of them as a deferred action person, but at the same time, as I pointed out, that would be revocable at any time. To the extent that there would be some reason to revoke that at that time, they would be able to have that opportunity.

So, again, it's not an amnesty in the sense of creating any legal right or entitlement for the person.

The person is simply put to the side as a matter of administrative convenience with some — to help focus the efforts of the enforcement authorities in the meantime in light of the severe resource constraints that the agency faces.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want to respond to?

MS. HARTNETT: No. I guess one other just point of clarification about the funding of the program. There was some discussion about whether this would be taking resources away from the enforcement efforts to have to pay for the administration of the DACA and DAPA programs. And I think among other places at page 26 of the OOC opinion, but as the plaintiff acknowledges, there will be fees

collected and this will be funded through that. So as the OOC opinion pointed out, there would not be any indication that there would be a strain of resources for removal efforts by having the DAPA and DACA programs exist.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Klayman.

MR. KLAYMAN: A few points. Some of the commentary that we heard in answer to your first question, it's not on the record, Your Honor. And there's no backup for that. So we ask Your Honor not to regard that in writing your opinion ultimately. Also I want to thank you for moving this case along quickly, because however you rule, it's clear this is probably going to the Supreme Court at some point.

THE COURT: I wouldn't predict.

MR. KLAYMAN: Make you more famous.

THE COURT: In this room I think you are the most famous person, Mr. Klayman.

MR. KLAYMAN: I'm glad you didn't say -- third point, with regard to injury, *United States v. Mills*, violation of the Constitution in and of itself has been found by the Supreme Court to give rise to irreparable injury.

The other thing I might add, and this was what was not stated accurately, is that in the memoranda today that are at issue here that you clarified at the beginning

of this hearing, it states explicitly that enforcement is to stop immediately. Everything stops to allow these people to come out from, you know, underground and come forward. And I ask you --

THE COURT: Where is that in, in which memorandum are you talking about? Are you talking about the November $20^{\mbox{th}}$ memoranda?

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. It's Exhibit D, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, I'm looking another document, ECF 6-4, and on page 3 of that document where it states — it has a justification for the case—by—case exercises of deferred action to encourage people to come out of the shadows, submit to background checks and so on, but I didn't see any reference in here to stopping removal proceedings for the priority, undocumented immigrants.

MR. KLAYMAN: If you look at page 5, it's the corollary what's being set there. It's implicit in that. Wherein it says, "ICE and CBP are instructed to immediately begin identifying persons in their custody as well as newly encountered individuals who meet the above criteria and may thus be eligible for deferred action to prevent the further expenditure and enforcement resources with regard to these individuals."

So what they are saying is we want to identify these people immediately because we don't want to have

them subject to deportation so as to prevent the further expenditure of enforcement resources. So it does have immediate effect in that regard. And the other two paragraphs are similar.

So that's the immediate harm. And -- but it doesn't have to be immediate harm. It has -- it can even just be imminent harm or respective harm, and that's what's important here.

And with regard -- we feel firmly Your Honor should make a ruling on the constitutionality, whether you agree with us or not. We ask that you make a ruling on that. But even under their concept of, this is not going to kick in --

THE COURT: So just like the judge in

Pennsylvania, even if I don't have to and I don't have a

case in controversy in front of me that entitles me as a

Federal judge to make a ruling, you want me to just opine?

MR. KLAYMAN: We don't want you to be like the judge in Western District. We want you to be yourself. But the reality is you have to reach that issue because there is a case of controversy here and there is a constitutional issue, and it falls within the scope of Section 706 of the APA. That's one of the reasons why you should invalidate what they did under the APA. You have to reach the constitutional issue. I read that a couple

times.

But in addition, what I'm trying to say is that under their scenario of when this thing kicks in, you can make a ruling, an expedited ruling that they have to have notice and comment, 30 days. Since they are claiming that this is not going to take effect until some time in February, that if Your Honor makes a quick ruling they are going to have to do notice and comment and the American people are going to have a right to respond.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Klayman, let me just, you know, satisfy the curiosity of people who are listening. I am not prepared to issue a ruling today, although I appreciate all the points you've made about the importance of this issue and I will — I do plan to be issuing an opinion very shortly on both your pending motion for a preliminary injunction and the government's pending motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

So you've all given me a lot to think about on a number of cases to review, and you've been presenting documents up until last night. And so I want an opportunity to fully consider those before I issue my ruling.

MR. KLAYMAN: Actually we filed last night because the ECF system was down.

1 THE COURT: I know. Sorry about that.

MR. KLAYMAN: We wanted -- we e-mailed them their document days ago so they would have it. But what I was basically saying the last point, if I may make a possible suggestion. You could issue an order quickly on the notice and comment and defer on the rest of it, because it's quite clear that this was not a policy, and even if it was, it would have to be under notice and comment. And if you issue that quickly, then it will give them the 30 days to publish the notice and comment. That should have been done, they admitted that in the memoranda with regard to other types of actions that they took such as visa status with regard to change of employment.

Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate your time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Thank you. You are all excused.

(Proceedings adjourned at 10:49 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I, Barbara DeVico, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

SIGNATURE OF COURT REPORTER

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